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Abstract
We define the concept of a logic frame, which extends the con-
cept of an abstract logic by adding the concept of a syntax and an
axiom system. In a recursive logic frame the syntax and the set of
axioms are recursively coded. A recursive logic frame is called recur-
sively (countably) compact, if every recursive (respectively, countable)
finitely consistent theory has a model. We show that for logic frames
built from the cardinality quantifiers ”there exists at least λ” recur-
sive compactness always implies countable compactness. On the other
hand we show that a recursively compact extension need not be count-
ably compact.
1 Introduction
For the definition of an abstract logic and a generalized quantifier the reader
is refereed to [2], [8], and [9]. Undoubtedly the most important among ab-
stract logics are the ones that have a complete axiomatization of validity.
In many cases, most notably when we combine even the simplest gener-
alized quantifiers, completeness of an axiomatization cannot be proved in
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ZFC alone but depends of principles like CH or ♦. Our approach is look
for ZFC-provable relationships between completeness, recursive compactness
and countable compactness of a logic, that would reveal important features
of the logic even if we cannot settle any one of these properties per se. For
example, the countable compactness of the logic L(Q1, Q2, Q3, . . .) cannot be
decided in ZFC, but we prove in ZFC that if this logic is recursively compact,
it is countably compact. We show by example that recursive compactness
does not in general imply countable compactness.
Examples of logics that have a complete axiomatization at least under
additional set theoretic assumptions are:
• The infinitary language Lω1ω [6].
• Logic with the generalized quantifier
Qαxφ(x, ~y) ⇐⇒ |{x : φ(x, ~y)| ≥ ℵα [16].
• Logic with the Magidor-Malitz quantifier
QMMα xyφ(x, y, ~z) ⇐⇒ ∃X(|X| ≥ ℵα ∧ ∀x, y ∈ Xφ(x, y, ~z)) [10].
• Logic with the cofinality quantifier
Qcofℵ0xyφ(x, y, ~z) ⇐⇒ {〈x, y〉 : φ(x, y, ~z)} has cofinality ℵ0 [14].
2 Logic Frames
Our concept of a logic frame captures the combination of syntax, semantics
and proof theory of an extension of first order logic. This is a very gen-
eral concept and is not defined here with mathematical exactness, as we do
not prove any general results about logic frames. All our results are about
concrete examples.
Definition 1 1. A logic frame is a triple
L∗ = 〈L, |=L,A〉,
where
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(a) 〈L, |=L〉 is a logic in the sense of Definition 1.1.1 in [2].
(b) A is a class of L∗-axioms and L∗-inference rules.
We write ⊢A φ if φ is derivable using the axioms and rules in A.
Example 2 Let
Lκλ = 〈Lκλ, |=Lκλ ,Aκλ〉,
where Aκλ has as axioms the obvious axioms and Chang’s Distributive Laws,
and as rules Modus Ponens, Conjunction Rule, Generalization Rule and the
Rule of Dependent Choices from [6]. This an old example of a logic frame
introduced by Tarski in the late 50’s and studied intensively, e.g. by Karp
[6].
Example 3 Let
L(Qα) = 〈L(Qα), |=L(Qα),AQα〉,
where AQα has as axioms the basic axioms of first order logic and
¬Qα(x = y ∨ x = z)
∀x(φ→ ψ)→ (Qαxφ→ Qαxψ)
Qαxφ(x)↔ Qαyψ(y), where φ(x, ...) is a formula of
L(Qα) in which y does not occur
Qαy∃xφ→ ∃xQαyφ ∨Qαx∃yφ,
and Modus Ponens as the only rule. The logic L(Qα) was introduced by
Mostowski [11] and the above frame by Keisler [7].
Example 4 Magidor-Malitz quantifier logic frame is
L(QMMα ) = 〈L(Q
MM
α ), |=,A
MM
α 〉,
where
QMMα xyφ(x, y, ~z) ⇐⇒ ∃X(|X| ≥ ℵα ∧X ×X ⊆ {〈x, y〉 : φ(x, y~z)}) [10]
and AMMα is the set of axioms and rules introduced by Magidor and Malitz in
[10].
Definition 5 1. A logic frame L∗ = (L, |=L,A) is recursive if
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(a) There is an effective algorithm which gives for each finite vocabu-
lary τ the set L[τ ] and for each φ ∈ L[τ ] a second order formula1
which defines the semantics of φ.
(b) There is an effective algorithm which gives the axioms and rules
of A.
2. A logic frame L∗ = 〈L, |=L,A〉 is a 〈κ, λ〉-logic frame, if each sen-
tence contains less than λ predicate, function and constant symbols,
and |L[τ ]| ≤ κ whenever the vocabulary τ has less that λ symbols alto-
gether.
Example 6 The logic frame Lκλ is a 〈κ
κ, κ〉-logic frame. It is effective, if
κ = λ = ω. The logic frame L(Qα) is an effective 〈ω, ω〉-logic frame. The
logic frame L(QMMα ) is an effective 〈ω, ω〉-logic frame.
Definition 7 A logic frame L∗ = 〈L, |=L,A〉 is:
1. complete if every A-consistent L-sentence has a model.
2. recursively compact if every L∗-theory which is recursive in the set of
axioms and rules, and which has the property that every finite subset
of it has a model, has itself a model.
3. (κ, λ)-compact if every L∗-theory of cardinality ≤ κ, every subset of
cardinality < λ of which is A-consistent, has a model.
4. countably compact, if it is (ω, ω)-compact.
For recursive logic frames recursive compactness has a simpler definition:
Every recursive theory, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a
model.
The logic frame Lκλ is complete if
1. κ = µ+ and µ<λ = µ, or
2. κ is strongly inaccessible, or
3. κ is weakly inaccessible, λ is regular and
(∀α < κ)(∀β < λ)(αβ < κ)[6].
1Second order logic represents a strong logic with an effectively defined syntax. It is
not essential, which logic is used here as long as it is powerful enough.
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Lκλ does not satisfy the completeness theorem if κ = λ is a successor cardinal
(D.Scott, see [6]). Lκλ is not (κ, κ)-compact unless κ is weakly compact, and
then also Lκκ is (κ, κ)-compact. Lκλ is not strongly compact unless κ is and
then also Lκκ is. If ℵ
<ℵα
α = ℵα, then by Chang’s Two-Cardinal Theorem,
L(Qα+1) is complete and countably compact. If V=L, then L(Qα) is complete
and countably compact for all α. The logic frame L(QMMα ) is complete, if we
assume ✸, ✸α and ✸α+1, but there is a forcing extension in which L(Q
MM
1 )
is not countably compact [1].
Completeness, which can always be achieved by adding new axioms, does
not imply recursive or countable compactness. However, if the axioms and
rules have a ”finite character”, as is the case in first order logic, then the
implication is true. Likewise, recursive compactness does not, a priori, imply
countable compactness (see below for an example), although usually counter-
examples to compactness in extensions of first order logic are very simple
theories. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 8 A logic frame L∗ = 〈L, |=L,A〉 has
1. finite recursive character if for every possible universe2 V ′
V ′ |= (L∗ is complete ⇒ L∗ is recursively compact).
2. finite (κ, λ)-character if for every possible universe V ′
V ′ |= (L∗ is complete ⇒ L∗ is (κ, λ)-compact).
3. recursive (κ, λ)-character if for every possible universe V ′
V ′ |= (L∗ is recursively compact ⇒ L∗ is (κ, λ)-compact).
Mere ”character” means (ω, ω)-character. ”Strong character”, means
(κ, ω)-character for all κ.
The definition of logic frames leaves many details vague, e.g. the exact
form of axioms and rules. Also the conditions of a recursive logic frame would
have to be formulated more exactly for any general results. Going into such
details would take us too much astray from the main purpose of this paper.
2I.e. inner model of forcing extension.
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Example 9 The logic frame Lκλ is not of finite (κ, κ)-character, unless κ =
ω, since it is in some possible universes complete, but not (κ, κ)-compact. The
logic frames L(Qα) and L(Q
MM
α ) are in some possible universes complete, but
in some not countably compact. We discuss below the problem whether they
have recursive or finite character.
3 A logic with recursive character
Let us consider the logic
L = L(Qαn)n<ω,
where 0 < α0 < α1 < . . . are arbitrary ordinals. We cannot say in general
whether L is countably compact or not. If CH holds, then L is countable
compact [13], but it is consistent that L(Qn+1)n<ω is not countably compact
[12]. There is a natural axiom system A for L based on so called identities.
Using the methods of [13] it follows that if ℵ0 is small for each ℵαn (µ is small
for λ if for every λi, i < µ, we have
∏
i<µ λi < λ), then this axiom system is
complete and L is countably compact. In this section we show that if L is
recursively compact, then L is countably compact. Thus L gives rise to an
example of a logic frame with recursive character.
The model theory of L is closely tied with the model theory of (ℵαn)n<ω-
like models. This follows from usual reduction techniques (see [2, p. 45]).
We define now a generalized concept of identity needed for the formulation
of the axioms of the logic L. The concept of identity was introduced in [13]
(see also [2, p. 188] for a survey). A generalized identity is a sequence of
finite equivalence relations on finite sets such that equivalent sets have the
same size. In addition, the generalized identities are attached with a finite
sequence of functions.
Definition 10 1. A generalized identity is a triple
I = 〈(Dn)n<m, (In,a)n<m,a∈Dn , (hn)n<m〉,
where
(a) Each Dn is a finite set of ordinals,
(b) n < n′ implies Dn ⊆ Dn′ = ∅,
(c) Each In,a, a ∈ Dn, is an equivalence relation on D
<ω
n ,
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(d) xIn,ay implies |x| = |y| for all x and y,
(e) hn : D
<ω
n → Dn and n < m implies hn ⊆ hm.
2. Suppose
I = 〈(Dn)n<m, (In,a)n<m,a∈Dn, (hn)n<m〉
and
I ′ = 〈(D′n)n<m′, (I
′
n,a)n<m′,a∈D′n, (h
′
n)n<m′〉
are generalized identities. We say that I is a subidentity of I ′, if there
are a one-to-one σ : m → m′ and an order-preserving π : Di → D
′
σ(i)
such that
xIn,ay ⇐⇒ π[x]I
′
σ(n),pi(a)π[y]
and π(hi(x)) ≥ h
′
i(π[x]). If such bijections π and σ exist, then the
generalized identities are called equivalent.
3. Let F be the class of all F = 〈(Fl,α)l<ω,α<ωα
l
, (hl)l<ω〉, where
Fl,α : [ωαl]
<ω → κl,α
such that ℵ0 ≤ κl,α < ℵαl and
hl : [ωαl]
<ω → ωαl.
4. If X ⊆
⋃
l<ω ωαl is finite, then F induces the generalized identity
I = 〈(Dn)n<m, (In,a)n<m,a∈Dn , (hn)n<m〉,
where
(a) {l : ℵαl ∈ X} = {l0, ..., lm−1},
(b) Dn = ωαln ∩X,
(c) xIi,αy if and only if Fli,α(x) = Fli,α(y).
5. I(F) denotes the set of identities which are subidentities of those in-
duced by F . I<ω(F) = {I ∈ I(F) : ∀n < m(Dn ⊆ ω)}
6. I(α) =
⋂
{I(F) : F ∈ F}, where α = 〈αn : n < ω〉.
7. A fundamental function for α is an F such that I(F) = I(α).
7
A priori, the elements of the domains Dn of a generalized identity can be
any ordinals, but up to equivalence, they can always be taken to be natural
numbers. Thus, if we assume a canonical coding of such generalized identities
by natural numbers, it makes sense to ask whether a certain set of identities
is recursive or not. Also, I<ω(F) = I(F) up to equivalence.
Definition 11 Suppose αn, n < ω are ordinals in increasing order. An
(ℵαn)n<ω-like model is a model A in a language with distinguished predi-
cates Pn, n < ω, and a binary predicate < such that for all n 〈P
A
n , <
A〉 is
ℵαn-like, i.e. a linear order of cardinality ℵαn and every initial segment is of
cardinality < ℵαn.
The definition of a generalized identity looks complicated but its meaning
becomes completely transparent when one realizes that it is exactly what
one needs to construct by means of Skolem functions and the Compactness
Theorem an (ℵαn)n<ω-like model for a first order theory.
Proposition 12 If there is a fundamental function for α, then L(Qαn)n<ω
is (λ, ω)-compact for any λ < ℵα0.
Proof. This is like [13]. Suppose F = 〈(Fl,α)l<ω,α<ωαl , (hl)l<ω〉 is a funda-
mental function for α. Suppose T is a finitely consistent L(Qαn)n<ω theory.
W.l.o.g. T has built-in Skolem functions, the language of T includes unary
predicates Pl, l < ω, and a binary predicate <, and it suffices to construct a
(〈ℵαl)l<ω-like model for T . Let T
∗ consist of T plus the axioms
1. clξ < c
l
η for ξ < η < ℵαl and l < ω,
2. Pl(c
l
ξ) for ξ < ℵαl and l < ω,
3. t(clξ1 , . . . , c
l
ξn
) < clhl(ξ1,...,ξn) for all terms t and (ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ (ℵαl)
n,
4. t(clξ1 , . . . , c
l
ξn
) = t(clη1 , . . . , c
l
ηn
)
∨(clα ≤ t(c
l
ξ1
, . . . , clξn) ∧ c
l
α ≤ t(c
l
η1
, . . . , clηn))
for all terms t and (ξ1, . . . , ξn) ∈ (ℵαl)
n such that Fl,α(ξ1, . . . , ξn) =
Fl,α(η1, . . . , ηn)
It is easy to see that the Skolem closure of the constants is (〈ℵαl)l<ω-like in
every model of T ∗. Thus it suffices to show that T ∗ is finitely consistent. We
refer to the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 in [2, Chapter V] for details. ✷
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A consequence of the above proof is:
Corollary 13 There is a set Ax(α) of valid sentences of L(Qαn)n<ω such
that if there is a fundamental function for α, then a sentence φ of L(Qαn)n<ω
is valid if and only if it follows from Ax(α) and the axiom schemas of first
order logic using rules of proof of first order logic. If I(α) is r.e., then so is
Ax(α).
The axiomatization Ax(α) may not be complete, but the point is, that if
there is a fundamental function for α, then it is complete. So we know the
axiomatization, but we do not always have a fundamental function. Likewise,
we do not know in general whether I(α) is r.e. but if it is, then Ax(α) gives
a recursive complete axiomatization of L(Qαn)n<ω. Thus the triple
L(Qαn)n<ω = 〈L(Qαn)n<ω, |=, Ax(α)〉
forms a logic frame, which is a recursive logic frame if I(α) is r.e. and
complete if there is a fundamental function for α.
Lemma 14 Suppose α = 〈αn : n < ω〉 is a sequence of ordinals in increas-
ing order. Suppose I is a generalized identity. There is a sentence φI in
L(Qαn)n<ω such that the following conditions are equivalent:
1. φI has a model.
2. I /∈ I(α)
Proof. Suppose I = 〈(Dn)n<m, (In,a)n<m,a∈Dn , (hn)n<m〉. The vocabulary
of φn,I has a unary predicate Pl, a binary predicate < and an i-ary function
symbol F il,a for each l < m, a ∈ Dl and i < n = |
⋃
j<mDj |. Let φ
−
I be the
conjunction of
1. 〈Pl, <l〉 is a ℵαl-like linear order for l < m,
2. F il : Pl × (Pl)
i → Pk,
3. F il (a, x) < gl(a),
4. hil : (Pl)
i → Pl.
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Any model M of φ−I givers rise to FM = 〈(Fl,α)l<ω,α<ωαl , (hl)l<ω〉, where
Fl,a(x) = (F
i
l,a)
M(x), if x ∈ ((Pl)
M)i
and
hl(x) = (h
i
l)
M(x), if x ∈ ((Pl)
M)i.
The sentence φI is the conjunction of φ
−
I and a first order sentence stating
that in models M of φI the identity I is not a subidentity of the identity
induced by FM . ✷
Lemma 15 If the L(Qαn)n<ω-theory {σI : I /∈ I(α)} has a model, there is
a fundamental function for α.
Proof. Suppose M is such a model. Let FM be as in the previous proof. It
is clear that FM is a fundamental function. ✷
Lemma 16 Every finite subset of the L(Qαn)n<ω-theory {σI : I /∈ I(α)}
has a model.
Proof. Suppose I /∈ I(α). It suffices to show that σI has a model. Let F =
〈(Fl,α)l<ω,α<ωαl , (hl)l<ω〉 be such that I is not a subidentity of one induced
by F . It is easy to build a (〈ℵαl)l<ω-like model M from F so that M |= σI .
✷
Theorem 17 The logic frame L(Qαn)n<ω has recursive character for all α.
Proof. If there is a fundamental function forα, then L(Qαn)n<ω is countably
compact by Proposition 12. Thus we may assume that there is no funda-
mental function for α. Let J = {In : n < ω} be a canonical enumeration of
all I /∈ I(α). Let T be the L(Qαn)n<ω-theory consisting of
1. ”c has at least n predecessors in <”, for n < ω,
2. ”If c has at least n predecessors in <, then σIn”.
The theory T is recursive in J , and finitely consistent by Lemma 16. On the
other hand, any model of T would give rise to a fundamental function for α
by Lemma 15. ✷
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4 A logic which does not have recursive char-
acter
We show that there is a logic frame L∗ which is recursively compact but not
countably compact. We make use of the quantifier QSt from [14]. To recall
the definition of QSt we adopt the following notation:
Definition 18 Let A = (A,R) be an arbitrary ℵ1-like linearly ordered struc-
ture. We use H(A) to denote the set of all initial segments of A. A filtration
of A is subset X of H(A) such that A =
⋃
I∈X I and X is closed under
unions of increasing sequences. Let D(A) be the filter on H(A) generated by
all filtrations of A.
The quantifier QSt is defined as follows:
Definition 19 The generalized quantifier QSt is defined by
A |= QStxyφ(x, y,~a)
if and only if
A = (A,Rφ), where Rφ = {(b, c) : A |= φ(b, c,~a)}
is an ℵ1-like linear ordered structure such that
{I ∈ H(A) : I does not have a sup in Rφ} /∈ D(A).
It follows from [15] and [3] that L(QSt) equipped with some natural ax-
ioms and rules is a complete countably compact logic frame.
Definition 20 If S ⊆ ω1, then the generalized quantifier Q
St
S is defined by
A |= QStS xyφ(x, y,~a)
if and only if Rφ is an ℵ1-like linear order of A with a filtration {Iα : α < ω1}
such that
∀α < ω1((Iα has a sup in Rφ) ⇐⇒ α ∈ S).
The syntax of the logic
LSt
is defined as follows: LSt extends first order logic by the quantifiers Q1,
QSt and the infinite number of new formal quantifiers QStXn (we leave Xn
unspecified).
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If we fix a sequence 〈S0, S1, ...〉 and let Q
St
Xn
be interpreted as QStSn , we
get a definition of semantics of LSt. We call this semantics the 〈S0, S1, ...〉-
interpretation of LSt.
Definition 21 We call a finite sequence σ = 〈S0, S1, ..., Sn〉 (or an infinite
sequence 〈S0, S1, ...〉) of subsets of ω1 stationary independent, if all finite
Boolean combinations of the sets Si are stationary.
We will show now that the set of valid sentences of LSt is independent of
the sequence S0, S1, ..., as long as this sequence is stationary independent.
Rather than giving an explicit axiom system for LSt we manipulate models
of set theory in order to get the same results. Throughout, we use ZFC0 to
denote a finite fragment of ZFC sufficient for the arguments involved. This
is only to guarantee the existence of models. We make extensive use of the
following result of Hutchinson:
Lemma 1 [4] Suppose M is a countable model of ZFC0 and S ∈ M such
that
M |= ”S ⊆ ω1 is stationary”.
Then there is a countable N such that M ≺ N, N has a least new ordinal δ,
N |= δ ∈ S, and every a ∈M such that M |= ”aǫω1” remains fixed i.e.
∀b ∈ N([N |= bǫa]→ b ∈M).
As pointed out in [5, Theorem 3.5], Lemma 1 can be iterated ω1 times to get
an elementary extension N of M such that 〈ωN1 , ǫ
N〉 is an ℵ1-like linear order
with a filtration 〈Cα : α < ω1〉 such that Cα ∈ N and
{α : N |= ”Cα has a sup in S”}
is a club subset of ω1. In the proof of [2, Theorem 3.2.2] this idea is elaborated
by splitting ω1 first into ℵ1 disjoint stationary sets and then extending all
possible stationary sets, one at a time. This yields an elementary extension
N of M such that
(G) 〈ωN1 , ǫ
N〉 is an ℵ1-like linear order with a filtration 〈Cα : α < ω1〉 such
that each Cα is in N and if N |= ”S ⊆ ω1 is stationary”, then
{α : N |= ”Cα has a sup in S”}
is a stationary subset of ω1.
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Let us call a model M of set theory good, if it satisfies (G). We have sketched
a proof of:
Lemma 2 Every countable model M of ZFC has a good elementary exten-
sion of cardinality ℵ1.
With a minor modification we get:
Lemma 3 Suppose M is a countable model of ZFC0 and σ ∈M such that
M |= ”σ = 〈S0, S1, ...〉 is stationary independent.”
Suppose 〈T0, T1, ..., Tn〉 is an arbitrary stationary independent sequence. Then
there is a good elementary extension N of M such that 〈ωN1 , ǫ
N〉 is an ℵ1-like
linear order with a filtration 〈Cα : α < ω1〉 and a club D such that for all
α < ω1 Cα ∈ N and for all i = 0, ..., n and all α ∈ D we have
N |= ”Cα has a sup in Si” ⇐⇒ α ∈ Ti.
Proof. One can imitate the proof in [5, Theorem 3.5] and the proof of [2,
Theorem 3.2.2]. W.l.o.g., the sets in 〈S0, S1, ..., Sn〉 partition ω1 in M and
the same holds for 〈T0, T1, ..., Tn〉. In the iteration of Lemma 1 we extend at
stage ξ the set Si if ξ ∈ Ti. ✷
Proposition 4 Suppose φ is a sentence of LSt. Then the following condi-
tions are equivalent:
1. φ has a model in some 〈S0, S1, ...〉-interpretation, where 〈S0, S1, ...〉 is
stationary independent.
2. φ has a model in all 〈S0, S1, ...〉-interpretations, for 〈S0, S1, ...〉 station-
ary independent.
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ LSt. Choose n ∈ ω such that φ contains no quantifiers
QStXi for i > n. Let Φ(A, σ, φ) be a formula of set theory expressing the
conjunction of ”A |= φ in the σ-interpretation” and ”σ = 〈S0, S1, ..., Sn〉 is
stationary independent” in such a way that if M is a good model of ZFC0
containing A and σ, then the following conditions are equivalent:
• 〈A, σ〉 |= φ.
• M |= Φ(A, σ, φ)
The claim follows now from Lemma 3. ✷
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Definition 5 Let Val(LSt) be the set of sentences of LSt which are valid
under 〈S0, S1, ...〉-interpretation for some (equivalently, all) stationary inde-
pendent 〈S0, S1, ...〉.
Proposition 6 The set Val(LSt) is recursively enumerable, provably in ZFC.
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ LSt. Let Φ be as in the proof of Proposition 4. By
Lemma 3 we have the equivalence of
• ¬φ /∈ Val(LSt).
• ZFC0 ∪ {∃A∃σΦ(A, σ, φ)} is consistent in L.
Since the latter is a Π01-property of φ, we have proved the claim. ✷
Corollary 7 There is a recursive set Ax(LSt) of sentences of LSt such that
a sentence of LSt is in Val(LSt) if and only if it follows from Ax(LSt) and
the axiom schemas of first order logic using rules of proof of first order logic.
Definition 8 Suppose 〈S0, S1, ...〉 is stationary independent. We define a
new recursive logic frame
LSt(S0, S1, ...) = 〈L
St, |=,A〉,
where A consists of Ax(LSt) and the axioms and rules of first order logic.
Corollary 9 (Completeness Theorem for LSt(S0, S1, ...)) The logic frame
LSt(S0, S1, ...) is complete.
The axioms of LSt(S0, S1, ...) state the stationary independence of 〈S0, S1, ...〉.
Thus the completeness of LSt(S0, S1, ...) is vacuous for stationary noninde-
pendent 〈S0, S1, ...〉. The same method gives the following partial count-
able compactness result: Suppose S0, S1, ... is stationary independent. Any
finitely consistent countable theory in LSt, which contains an occurrence of
QStXn for only finitely many n, has a model.
Note that the syntax and the axioms of LSt(S0, S1, ...) are independent
of 〈S0, S1, ...〉. We conjecture that there is a natural complete axiom system
for all LSt(S0, S1, ...) based on
• The usual axioms and rules of L(Q1) as in [7].
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• Natural axioms (like Fodor’s Lemma) for QSt as in [3].
• Axiom schemas stating the stationary independence of 〈S0, S1, ...〉.
Let LStω1ω(S0, S1, ...) be the extension of L
St obtained by allowing countable
conjunctions and disjunctions.
Proposition 10 Suppose φ ∈ LStω1ω. The predicate ”φ has a model” is a
ΣZFC1 -definable property of φ.
Proof. It suffices to notice that if M is ω-standard in Lemma 1, then so is
N. ✷
By making different choices for the stationary independent 〈S0, S1, ...〉,
we can get logics with different properties. We illustrate this now by making
a choice of 〈S0, S1, ...〉 which will render L
St(S0, S1, ...) recursively compact
but not countably compact.
Let us fix a countable vocabulary τ which contains infinitely many sym-
bols of all arities. Let Tn, n < ω, list all Ax(L
St)-consistent recursive LSt-
theories in the vocabulary τ . Let τn be a new disjoint copy of τ for each
n < ω. Let τ ∗ consist of the union of all the τn, the new binary predicate
symbol <∗, and new unary predicate symbols Pn for n < ω. If φ is a formula
and d ∈ 2, let (φ)d be φ, if d = 0, and ¬φ, if d = 1. If S ⊆ ω1, then (S)
d is
defined similarly. For any η : ω → 2 let ψη ∈ L
St
ω1ω
be the conjunction of the
following sentences of the vocabulary τ ∗:
(a) Tn translated into the vocabulary τ
n.
(b) <∗ is an ℵ1-like linear order of the universe.
(c) QStXnxy(x <
∗ y ∧ Pn(x) ∧ Pn(y)).
(d) ¬∃x
∧
n(Pn(x))
η(n).
Lemma 11 There is η : ω → 2 such that ψη has a model.
Proof. Let Γ consist of the sentences (a)-(c). By Corollary 9, Γ has a model
M of cardinality ℵ1 in the 〈S0, S1, ...〉-interpretation for some stationary in-
dependent 〈S0, S1, ...〉. Get a new η : ω → 2 by Cohen-forcing. Then in the
extension V [η] ⋂
n
(Sn)
η(n) = ∅.
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Thus V [η] satisfies the Σ1-sentence
∃η(ψη has a model). (1)
By the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Lemma and Proposition 10 there is η
in V such that (1) holds in V . ✷
Now let 〈S∗0 , S
∗
1 , ...〉 be stationary independent such that ψη has a model
M
∗ in the 〈S∗0 , S
∗
1 , ...〉-interpretation.
Theorem 22 The recursive logic frame LSt(S∗0 , S
∗
1 , ...) is recursively compact
but not countably compact.
Proof. Suppose T is a consistent recursive theory in LSt. W.l.o.g. T = Tm
for some m < ω. Thus M∗ ↾ τn gives immediately a model of T . To
prove that LSt is not countably compact, let T be a theory consisting of the
following sentences:
(i) <∗ is an ℵ1-like linear order.
(ii) QStS∗nxy(x <
∗ y ∧ Pn(x) ∧ Pn(y)) for n < ω.
(iii) QStxy(x <∗ y ∧ P (x) ∧ P (y)).
(iv) ∀x(P (x)→ (Pn(x))
η(n)) for n < ω.
Any finite subtheory of T contains only predicates P0, ..., Pm for some m, and
has therefore a model: we let Pi = S
∗
i for i = 0, ..., m and
P = (P0)
η(0) ∩ ... ∩ (Pm)
η(m).
On the other hand, suppose 〈A,<∗, P, P0, P1, ...〉 |= T . By (ii) there are
filtrations 〈Dnα : α < ω1〉 of <
∗ and clubs En such that for all n and for all
α ∈ En
{α < ω1 : D
n
α has a sup in 〈A,<
∗〉} = S∗n.
By (iii) there is a filtration 〈Fα : α < ω1〉 of <
∗ such that
B = {α < ω1 : Fα has a sup in P}
is stationary. Let E∗ ⊆
⋂
nEn be a club such that Cα = D
n
α = Fα for
α ∈ E∗ and n < ω. Let δ ∈ E∗ ∩ B and a = supFδ. Then a ∈ P . Hence
a ∈
⋂
n(Pn)
η(n) by (iv). As a = supDnδ for all n, we have a ∈
⋂
n(S
∗
n)
η(n),
contrary to the choice of η. We have proved that theory T has no models. ✷
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Thus LSt does not have finite character. We end with an example of a
logic which, without being provably complete, has anyhow finite character:
Recall that ♦S for S ⊆ ω1 is the statement that there are sets Aα ⊆ α,
α ∈ S, such that for any X ⊆ ω1, the set {α ∈ S : X ∩α = Aα} is stationary.
Definition 12 Let L♦ be the extension of L by Q1, Q
St and QStS♦, where
S♦ =


∅, if there is no bistationary S with ♦S
ω1, if there is a bistationary S with ♦S but no maximal one
S, if S is a maximal bistationary S with ♦S
We get a recursive logic frame L♦ = 〈L♦, |=,A〉 by adapting the set Ax(LSt)
to the case of just one bistationary set.
Theorem 13 L♦ has finite character.
Proof. Suppose there is no bistationary S with ♦S. Then the consistent
sentence “< is an ℵ1-like linear order ∧Q
Stxy(x < y) ∧QStS♦(x < y)” has no
model, so L is incomplete. Suppose there is a bistationary S with ♦S but no
maximal one. Then the consistent sentence “< is an ℵ1-like linear order ∧
QStxy(x < y ∧ P (x)) ∧ QStS♦(x < y ∧ ¬P (x))” has no model, so L is again
incomplete. Finally, suppose there is a maximal bistationary S with ♦S .
Now L is countably compact by the remark right after Corollary 9. ✷
Our results obviously do not aim to be optimal. We merely want to
indicate that the concept of a logic frame offers a way out of the plethora of
independence results about generalized quantifiers. The logic L(Qn+1)n<ω is
a good example. The results about its countable compactness under CH and
countable incompactness in another model of set theory leave us perplexed
about the nature of the logic. Having recursive character reveals something
conclusive and positive, and raises the question, do other problematic logics
also have recursive character. Our logic LSt is the other extreme: it is always
completely axiomatizable, but a judicious choice of 〈S0, S1, ...〉 renders it
recursively compact without being countably compact.
Open Question: Does the Magidor-Malitz logic L(QMM1 ) have recursive
character?
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